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PLATO’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONCEPTUALISM. 
PARMENIDES 132 B 3-C 11 RECONSIDERED* 
 
 
Plato’s Parmenides confronts us with a curious, unusual situation: 
The Socrates that we know only all too well as the white bearded saga-
cious old man appears as a young student. Indeed, a student defend-
ing his innovative theory of the Forms against the severe, though not 
eristic criticism of the old Eleatic Parmenides. In the course of plead-
ing his case before the old man, he advances the thesis that Forms 
could only be thoughts that originate nowhere else but in souls or 
minds1. This is commonly identified with a conceptualist interpreta-
tion of the Forms, namely that Forms or universals exist only within 
the mind and have no external or substantial reality2. 
 
* Two earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Centre for the Study of 
the Platonic Tradition (Dublin) and at the conference “Plato Transformed. An Inter-
national Workshop on Plato’s Ancient Commentators” (Leuven, 18-19 May 2005). I 
am especially indebted to Carlos Steel (Leuven) for his remarks and criticism, which 
led me to rethink and improve many points that are suggested in what follows. 
Moreover, I would like to thank John Dillon (Dublin) and Russell Friedman (Leuven) 
whose incisive observations helped to clarify several important issues. Prof. Friedman 
was so kind to also provide help with the English. The final version profited also from 
comments offered by David Sedley (Cambridge). 
1 Parm. 132 B 3-5. 
2 That the suggestion of Socrates is identical with a conceptualist position is, for 
instance, held by F. VON KUTSCHERA, Platons ‘Parmenides’, Berlin-New York 1995, 
pp. 35-6; R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, Translated with comment (“The Dialogues 
of Plato”, IV), rev. ed. New Haven-London 1997 (first published in 1983), p. 175; A. 
GRAESER, Platons ‘Parmenides’ (“Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz, 
Abhandlungen der Geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse”, III), Stuttgart 2003, 
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From the viewpoint of the later dialogues, one might ask what 
has led Socrates to this rather surprising suggestion? To under-
stand the origin of Socrates’ claim, it is first of all necessary to turn 
to Parmenides’ criticism of Socrates’ theory of Forms. This criticism 
can be summarised in six arguments or difficulties (ajporivai), of 
which the third is the primary concern here3. The first addresses the 
question whether participation is in the whole or in a part of the 
Form (Parm. 131 A 4-E 7). The second shows that the “abstraction” 
of a Form from a manifold of large things (megavla) leads to an infi-
nite regress (131 E 8-132 B 2). It is also known as the first Third-
Man argument. The third difficulty is introduced by the sugges-
tion that Forms should be thoughts in human minds (132 B 3-C 
11). The fourth demonstrates that, given that Forms are paradigms 
in/within nature, participation would entail an infinite regress (132 
C 12-133 A 10). This argument is better known as the second 
Third-Man argument. The last two ajporivai are complementary in 
that the first points out that if the Forms are separate entities, we 
cannot have knowledge of them (133 A 11-134 C 3), while the sec-
ond claims that if the Forms are separate and only the gods know 
them, the gods cannot, at the same time, know human affairs. 
These two last ajporivai together are also known as the so-called 
worst difficulty (mevgiston de; tovde, 133 B), because they virtually 
annihilate divine providence (cfr. 134 C: deinovteron tovde). Each of 
 
p. 20; and F. FERRARI, Platone. Parmenide, Milano 2004, p. 79. Kutschera further re-
marks that the text is, in fact, our first testimony for such a conceptualist interpreta-
tion of universals. For a general characterisation of concepts and conceptualism in the 
history of thought, see, for instance, W. HÜBNER, “Konzept/konzeptibel” and “Konzeptua-
limus”, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Band 4: I-K, Basel-Stuttgart 1976, 
coll. 1082-91. That Socrates’ suggestion in this argument is not conceptualist is main-
tained by B. BOSSI, Is Socrates Really Defending Conceptualism in ‘Parmenides’ 132b3-d4?, 
in A. HAVLÍČEK-F. KARFÍK (eds), Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, Proceedings of the Fourth Sym-
posium Platonicum Pragense, Prague 2005, pp. 58-74. 
3 I follow an interpretation of Proclus that can be found in book three and four 
of his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. Cfr. the comprehensive analysis of Proclus’ dis-
cussion of these ajporivai proposed by C. STEEL, L’Anagogie par les apories, in G. BOSS-
G. SEEL (éds.), Proclus et son influence, Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel (Juin 1985), avec 
une introduction de F. Brunner, Zürich 1987, pp. 101-28. 
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these six steps (or ajporivai) in the first part of the dialogue depend 
on those that precede it and they unfold in sequence. Each new 
suggestion about the nature of the Forms or participation should 
be seen as a reaction to a difficulty raised in the previous step. 
With the suggestion that Forms are thoughts, young Socrates 
introduces ajporiva three, and the text makes it clear that he is ad-
dressing problems raised in ajporiva one and two. If the Forms are 
thoughts, Socrates maintains, they no longer face the difficulties 
mentioned in the first two ajporivai, because as thoughts each of 
them is one4. Hence, we have to keep in mind that with his concep-
tualist thesis Socrates wants primarily to safeguard the unity of the 
Forms. In his twofold reply, Parmenides will not question this 
unity, but demonstrates that a Form is rather an object of thought 
(noouvmenon) and not a thought (novhma), that is, a thought-process. 
The argument is based on the assumption that every thought has 
an object, is a thought of something. As we shall see, the main 
problem with Socrates’ suggestion lies in the fact that he does not 
specify how a novhma comes to be (ejggivgnesqai) in the soul, that is, 
from where or how it originates and what its object is. But before 
we enter into a discussion about the argument itself, let us say some 
words about Socrates’ proposal as such. 
 
 
Can Forms be Thoughts/Concepts? 
 
The thesis that with Plato Forms are thoughts is rather prob-
lematic both because of systematic considerations and also because 
no warrant for such an interpretation can be found in the dialogues 
themselves. If Forms are thoughts, their objectivity or shareability 
could no longer be guaranteed. They would no longer be the stan-
dards against which values and norms could be measured. Moreo-
ver, how could the fact that Forms are human thoughts accord with 
 
4 Parm. 132 B 5-6: ou{tw ga;r a]n e{n ge e{kaston ei[h kai; oujk a]n e[ti pavscoi a} 
nundh; ejlevgeto. 
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the Timaeus, in which the demiurge orders the all so as to become a 
cosmos by looking at the paradigm (the sum of Forms)? Hence, 
strong evidence points to the fact that for Plato, Forms are rather 
the objective correlates of thought; they are not concepts, that is, 
mental entities that are confined to souls5. 
One might answer that Socrates’ suggestion could also be read 
as saying that Forms are divine thoughts. What we would get, then, 
is the well known Middle Platonic doctrine of the Forms as 
thoughts of God6. Forms would be divine concepts, and accord-
ingly divine standards7. However, it seems questionable whether the 
character of the dialogue provides a context for such an interpreta-
tion. Moreover, the fact that Plato uses the plural “souls” (Parm. 
132 B 5) clearly points, I think, to human souls. 
There has been a lively discussion as to whose position Plato is 
targeting with the refutation of the suggestion that Forms are 
thoughts. For it is obvious that making the young Socrates the 
mouthpiece of such a position is a dramatic device. The view that 
Forms are thoughts or concepts in the human mind has been as-
 
5 That Platonic Forms are not concepts was pointed out, for instance, by H. 
CHERNISS, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, I, Baltimore 1944, pp. 214-6 
note 128, and Y. LAFRANCE, Sur une lecture analytiques des arguments concernant le non-être 
(‘Sophiste’, 237 b10-239 a12), «Revue de Philosophie Ancienne», II (1984) pp. 41-76. 
6 According to J. DILLON, The Middle Platonists (80 B.C. to A.D. 220), London-
Ithaca (NY) 1977 (cfr. also the reprint with a new comprehensive afterword, Ithaca 
(NY) 1993), p. 95, this doctrine can already be found in Antiochus of Ascalon, but it 
may go back to the Old Academy. 
7 It is interesting to note, however, that in the later Neoplatonic discussion of 
the relationship between intellect and Forms, we frequently find the assertion that 
these divine Forms do not have a conceptual character, that is, they do not originate in 
thought and are not, strictly speaking, thought-dependent. They are rather prior to 
thought. Regarding Plotinus and Proclus this was pointed out by P. HADOT, La con-
ception plotinienne de l’identité entre l’intellect et son objet. Plotin et le ‘De anima’ d’Aristote, in 
Plotin, Porphyre. Études néoplatoniciennes (“L’âne d’or”), Paris 1999 (first published 
1996), pp. 267-78, and R. SORABJI, Why the Neoplatonists did not have Intentional Objects 
of Intellection, in D. PERLER, Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality (“Studien und 
Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters”, LXXVI), Leiden-Boston-Köln 2001, pp. 
105-14. 
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cribed to Plato’s nephew Speusippus8. However, the evidence for 
this is not very persuasive9. Another candidate for such a conceptu-
alist position is Antisthenes10, but, here again, the evidence remains 
doubtful11. As has already been remarked, many scholars have tried 
to locate the view that Forms are thoughts with a particular phi-
losopher12, but instead Plato may not be directing his criticism ad 
hominem, as it were, but rather against the proposition itself. Let us, 
for a moment consider the possibility that the Parmenides is the first 
dialogue according to the dramatic chronology. We could say, then, 
that in the Parmenides Plato right from the start wanted to point out 
possible misunderstandings or difficulties in his theory of Forms. 
 
8 For instance, by J. STENZEL, s.v. Speusippus (n. 2), in RE II 6 (1929) col. 1665; 
J. HALFWASSEN, Geist und Selbstbewußtsein. Studien zu Plotin und Numenios (“Akademie 
der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozial-
wissenschaftlichen Klasse”, X), Stuttgart 1994, p. 62 note 177; A. METRY, Speusippos. 
Zahl – Erkenntnis – Sein, Bern-Stuttgart-Wien 2002, and A. GRAESER, Platons ‘Par-
menides’, cit., p. 21. It should be said that Stenzel is the only one of these scholars who 
does not use the word conceptualist or conceptualistic in this respect. He merely para-
phrases the doctrine attributed by Ps.-Alexander to Speusippus, namely that for the 
latter Forms are dianoivai. This paraphrase, however, entails that he basically trusts the 
report by Ps.-Alexander. For the discussion, see the following note. 
9 In particular, see H.J. KRÄMER, Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre. Zur 
Geschichte des Universalienproblems im Platonismus, «Archiv für Geschichte der Philoso-
phie», LV (1973) p. 163 note 173, who argues that the testimony for this (PS.-ALEX. 
[MICHAEL OF EPHESUS] in metaph. 782.31 ff. [fr. 42f Lang, fr. 78 Isnardi Parente]) 
should not be trusted. It is not entirely clear what M. ISNARDI PARENTE, Speusippo. 
Frammenti, Edizione, traduzione e commento (“La scuola di Platone”, I), Napoli 1980, 
p. 312, makes of the text, but there are elements in her interpretation of the fragment 
that suggest that she doubts its authenticity. Also J. DILLON, The Heirs of Plato. A 
Study of the Old Academy (347-274 BC), Oxford 2003, pp. 48-9, judges that for 
Speusippus Platonic Forms are not (human) concepts. He would rather locate them in 
the world soul. 
10 Fr. 149 (Giannantoni). On the relationship between Antisthenes and Plato 
cfr. the study by A. BRANCACCI, Antisthène. Le discours propre, Préface de l’auteur à la 
traduction française, traduit de l’italien par S. AUBERT, Paris 2005 (first published 
1990), pp. 151-71. 
11 A. GRAESER, Platons ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 20, for instance, argues against the 
Antisthenes hypothesis, while A. BRANCACCI, Antisthène cit., pp. 165-8, still main-
tains that Plato is attacking Antisthenes. 
12 A. GRAESER, Platons ‘Parmenides’, cit., even claims that the whole first part of 
the dialogue is directed against Speusippus. 
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Hence with the argument against conceptualism, he probably in-
tended to show that Forms are not (human) thought dependent 
entities. 
Before we turn to analyse Parmenides’ reply to Socrates’ sugges-
tion, it should be said (as was observed by many commentators) that 
with Socrates’ suggestion that Forms are thoughts, Plato may have 
intended to allude to Parmenides’ doctrine of the identity of being 
and thought. It is, however, not so clear what Plato was exactly aim-
ing at with this reference. He, most probably wanted to illustrate 
that the identity thesis of being and thought is not valid, or, at least, 
needs to be qualified13. With Plato, only entities that really exist, that 






13 F.M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides’ Way of Truth and Plato’s 
‘Parmenides’, Translated with an Introduction and a running Commentary, London 
1939, p. 92, asserts that Plato, through the character Parmenides in the dialogue, re-
pudiates the doctrine that «to think is the same thing as to be». This seems to be also 
the opinion of R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 169, cfr. also note 30 below. On 
the other hand, K. DORTER, Form and Good in Plato’s Eleatic Dialogues, Berkeley-Los 
Angeles-London 1994, pp. 35-6, upholds that the argument agrees with the doctrine 
of the historical Parmenides. This is also the thesis of L. BRISSON, S’il (= le monde) est 
un. La seconde partie du ‘Parménide’ de Platon considérée du point de vue de Parménide et de 
Zénon, in M. BARBANTI-F. ROMANO (a cura di), Il ‘Parmenide’ di Platone e la sua tradi-
zione, Atti del III Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo 
(Catania, 31 maggio-2 giugno 2001), Catania 2002, p. 53. A.H. COXON, The Philoso-
phy of Forms. An Analytical and Historical Commentary on Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, with a new 
English translation, Assen 1999, p. 108, even claims that Parmenides in his refutation 
of Socrates’ suggestion is «applying to it the argument of his poem». J.A. PALMER, 
Plato’s Reception of Parmenides, Oxford 1999, does not discuss the issue in connection 
with Parm. 132 B 3-C 11. Finally, S. SCOLNICOV, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, Translated with 
Introduction and Commentary, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2003, pp. 1-6, main-
tains that Plato’s whole dialogue is directed against Parmenides. Already the dialogue 
between Zeno and the young Socrates, at the outset of the work, points to the fact that 
Socrates, with his theory of Forms, wanted to solve problems that were posed by Par-
menides’ doctrine of being. Therefore it is safer to maintain that Plato tried to qualify 
Parmenides’ doctrine of the identity of being and thought. 
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Parmenides’ Argument Reconsidered 
 
At first sight, it might be surprising that in Parmenides’ re-
ply we do not find any of the arguments a modern reader of Plato 
might advance against the thesis that Forms are thoughts. I mean 
first of all the arguments from shareability and objectivity14, that is, 
the fact that thoughts are not necessarily the same for every indi-
vidual and that they therefore are not necessarily objective stan-
dards. Parmenides builds his refutation on other grounds, as will 
become clear from the following summary. 
 
(A) PARMENIDES’ FIRST ARGUMENT 
(a1) Forms are thoughts15. 
 
14 Cfr. A. GRAESER, Platons ‘Parmenides’, cit., pp. 20-1: «[E]ine Deutung von 
Ideen als gedankliche Entitäten könnte sich ohnehin nur für den Fall anbieten, daß 
die in Frage stehenden Gebilde objektiven und damit intersubjektiven Charakter hät-
ten». Cfr. also F.M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides cit., p. 91, and R.E. ALLEN, 
Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 168. 
15 Note that at Parm. 132 B 3-4, the subjunctive with mhv expresses a doubtful 
assertion, cfr. H.W. SMYTH, Greek Grammar, revised by G.M. MESSING, Harvard 
1956 (200221; first published 1920), § 1801. This stresses the character of Socrates’ 
suggestion as rather tentative. In the same passage, some scholars have been tempted 
not to take touvtwn together with tẁn eijdẁn, but to interpret it as an objective genitive 
going with novhma. This is, for instance, the view of R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, 
cit., p. 173, and S. SCOLNICOV, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 63. M.L. GILL-P. RYAN, 
Plato. Parmenides, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1996, p. 39, have even assumed that Socra-
tes was deliberately unclear. To my mind, touvtwn should certainly belong to tẁn 
eijdẁn, because otherwise Socrates would, with his own suggestion, already anticipate 
the argument to follow. For only after Socrates has suggested that the Forms are 
thoughts, does Parmenides show that every thought must have an object. If Socrates in 
Parm. 132 B 3-5 had already said that Forms are thoughts of “these things” (touvtwn), 
Parmenides could skip the first step of his argument. Moreover, there are no suitable 
canditates to figure as the point of reference for “these things”. Finally, Proclus in his 
commentary ad loc. does not mention any ancient commentator who would not have 
taken touvtwn together with tẁn eijdẁn. To avoid the difficulty F. FERRARI, Platone. Par-
menide, cit., p. 217 note 51, proposes to read, with the codex T, touvtwn h/\. However, from 
a palaeographical point of view it is not very likely that this is what Plato wrote, since 
Proclus in his commentary ad loc. and the majority of the mss. confirm the reading h/\ 
touvtwn. Admittedly, the word order is rather unusual, but it seems not impossible to 
understand the sense correctly. This is also confirmed by most of the older translators 
who kept the word order, but nevertheless took touvtwn together with tẁn eijdẁn. 
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(a2) Thoughts are always thoughts of something that is. 
(a3) This something is over/on “all these things” (ejpi; pa`sin), it is a 
unity, one Form (ijdeva), always the same. 
(a3’) It is a unity, because it is thought to be one (to; noouvmenon e}n 
ei\nai). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(Ac) Forms are not thoughts (i.e. thought processes), but rather ob-
jects of thought (noouvmena). 
 
 
(B) PARMENIDES’ SECOND ARGUMENT 
(b1) Forms are thoughts (i.e. thought processes). 
(b2) All participants become like the Forms (Parm. 129 a 3-6)16. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Bc) Either everything, since it consists of thoughts (ejk nohmavtwn 
ei\nai), thinks or everything (i.e. all the participants), although it 
consists of thoughts, does not think (ajnovhto")17. 
 
 
16 It has been objected that this premiss may not be universally valid since the 
passage in question (129 A 3-6) talks only about forms of Likeness and Unlikeness and 
not about forms in general. However, the argument is clearly based on the assumption 
that participants become like the forms they are participating in (cfr. also 130 E-131 
A). There is no indication in the whole of the Parmenides or in other Platonic dialogues 
that this assumption is problematic. What is discussed, however, is how exactly the 
participants can become like the Forms. Or, in other words, how participation works. 
What is troublesome in the argument is the phrase ejk nohmavtwn e{kaston ei\nai – eve-
rything consists of thoughts (132 C 10-1), since already in difficulty one (131 A 4-E 7; 
esp. 131 E 3-5) it was stated that a Form cannot be present in the participant either as 
a whole or in part. However, it is perhaps more advisable not make too much of the 
expression ejk nohmavtwn e{kaston ei\nai, since it is found in a reductio argument. Con-
sider also that thoughts may be considered incorporeal (cfr. also S.C. RICKLESS, Plato’s 
Forms in Transition. A Reading of the ‘Parmenides’, Cambridge 2007, p. 80: «we may 
safely presume that thoughts do not have parts» – Rickless, however, favours the read-
ing that the whole thought is in the participant; an option which is certainly excluded 
in difficulty one) so that the problems of difficulty one where forms were apparently 
considered corporeal entities do not arise. However that may be, it is clear how Par-
menides’ argument is supposed to work in the given context. 
17 This reconstruction, especially the correct translation of ajnovhto", is argued for 
below. It is immediately clear why the conclusion presents an absurdity, since inani-
mate beings like sticks and stones certainly do not think. Moreover, a thought 
(thought process) that does not think is likewise an impossibility. 
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Although the reconstruction of the argument as a whole is a 
matter of considerable disagreement among modern commentators, 
it seems clear that the first part is based on the distinction between, 
on the one hand, thought or thought process (novhma) and, on the 
other, the object of thought (noouvmenon). At this point, we cannot 
but notice a certain ambiguity. Speaking about “objects of 
thought” (noouvmena), we might mean that these objects are the con-
tents of thought, that is, they are mind dependent entities and 
hence confined to minds. However, “objects of thought” could also 
be entities that exist independently of a mind, but are nevertheless 
thought by this mind. In other words, objects of thought would 
be trees, dogs, etc. (really existing entities) that constitute the con-
tents of thought. In short, whenever we speak about objects of 
thought, we might mean either (g1) an inner-mental content or 
(g2) objects outside the mind that constitute or figure as such a con-
tent. It is clear that for non-conceptualists (g1) in many cases pre-
supposes (g2). On the other hand, fictitious entities such as goat-
stags or golden mountains can only be objects of thought in the 
sense (g1). Since my interpretation aims to show that Parmenides’ 
arguments are designed to refute conceptualism, I want to argue in 
what follows that noouvmenon refers to both (g1) and (g2) or, in other 
words, that the object of thought refers to something that is mind 
independent/outside the mind. It has, as it were, a fundamentum in re. 
Furthermore, in my reading, I have tacitly taken for granted 
that Parmenides’ reply is, in fact, twofold. This was already sug-
gested by Cornford18. However, as we shall see, Allen was to cast 




18 F.M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides cit., pp. 90-2. This interpretation can 
be traced back to PROCL. in Parm. IV 901, 24 Cousin: duvo lovgoi" crwvmeno" [scil. Par-
menides]. Several other modern interpreters agree with Cornford and Proclus. See, for 
instance, M.L. GILL-P. RYAN, Plato. Parmenides, cit., p. 39, M.H. MILLER, Plato’s 
‘Parmenides’. The Conversion of the Soul, Princeton 1986, pp. 54-5, and S.C. RICKLESS, 
Plato’s Forms in Transition cit., p. 75. 
312 CHRISTOPH HELMIG 
The Meaning of novhma and ajnovhto" 
 
At this point, a short digression is needed on the meaning of 
novhma and ajnovhto" in the argument. In the reconstruction, I have 
assumed that novhma means “thought process” or “act of thought”, 
following such respectable commentators and scholars as Proclus, F. 
Ast, and F.M. Cornford19. Modern interpreters, however, have been 
more reserved. Brisson, after remarking that novhma can have two 
meanings, active and passive (that is, thought process and object of 
thought)20, states: «C’est ce second sens qu’il faut, semble-t-il, ici 
privilégier, et non le premier qui cependant ne peut être exclu»21. 
Yet, a passage in the Parmenides itself makes it plain that novhma car-
ries an active meaning. In Parm. 132 C 3, we find the expression 
novhma noei`. The syntax of the sentence compels us to take novhma as 
 
19 Proclus explained novhma as novhsi" (in Parm. IV 892.9-15 Cousin); F. Ast in 
his Lexicon Platonicum likewise translated novhma as cogitatio and ajnovhto" as non cogitans. 
F.M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides cit., p. 91, in his magisterial commentary, 
translated ajnovhto" as not thinking and wrote «the word “thought” [novhma] is ambigu-
ous; but the context makes it plain that “thought” means an act of thinking». Also 
R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., pp. 169-70, recognises the ambiguity of the 
word novhma. 
20 Sometimes commentators did not realise that novhma can also have an active 
meaning. Even the grammarian A.N. JANNARIS, An Historical Greek Grammar, Lon-
don-New York 1897 (repr. Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 1987), § 1024, gives a 
flawed characterisation of the words ending in -ma when he notes that only after 600 
A.D. does -ma signify the action as well as the abstract notion, i.e. the result of action. 
P. HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus, I, Paris 1968, p. 362, has pointed out that this is not 
true as far as the Stoics are concerned: «Or, dans le stoïcisme, les formations en -ma 
sont utilisées très fréquemment pour désigner des activités (ejnevrghma, katovrqwma, 
aJmavrthma, eujcrhvsthma, blavmma, wjfevlhma)». Hadot himself is indebted to O. RIETH, 
Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik, Berlin 1933, p. 109 ff. 
21 L. BRISSON, Platon. Parménide, Traduction inédite, introduction et notes, 
Paris 19992 (first edition 1994), p. 39 note 85. F. FERRARI, Platone. Parmenide, cit., p. 
80, maintains that the word novhma means both “object of thought” and “thought 
process” in the passage. For this, he refers to G. CASERTANO, Critica delle idee ed ar-
gomentazione dialettica nella prima parte del ‘Parmenide’, in A.M. BATTEGAZZORE (a cura 
di), Dimostrazione, argomentazione dialettica e argomentazione retorica nel pensiero antico, 
Genova 1993, pp. 385-403: 395. However, the latter does not adduce any proof for 
the claim. 
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the subject of noeì22. Therefore, it can only have an active meaning. 
This confirms the older interpretations of Proclus, Ast, and Corn-
ford. On the other hand, R.E. Allen offered a counterargument 
against an exclusively active interpretation of novhma, namely that the 
word changes its meaning in the second part of the argument23. That 
such an interpretation is, however, untenable will be seen below in 
our analysis of Allen’s interpretation of the passage. 
As regards ajnovhto" (Parm. 132 C 11), both Ast and Cornford 
have rightly observed that it has the meaning non-thinking24. The 
arguments are as follows: (1) I. Schudoma was correct that Plato was 
intending a pun with the expression25. It can hardly be rendered in 
English26. (2) Plato uses ajnovhto" more than fifty times, while nohtov" 
 
22 Parm. 132 C 3-4: Oujc eJnov" tino", o} ejpi; pàsin ejkeìno to; novhma ejpo;n noeì, 
mivan tina; ou\san ijdevan… Already G. STALLBAUM (ed.), Platonis Parmenides cum quattuor 
libris prolegomenorum et commentario perpetuo, accedunt Procli in Parmenidem commentarii nunc 
emendatius editi, Lipsiae 1839, ad loc., gave the correct explanation of the sentence. 
novhma is the subject of the relative clause, and we should understand the construction 
as follows: o} ejkeìno to; novhma noeì ejpo;n ejpi; pàsin. ejpo;n ejpi; pàsin should be taken 
together with o}. 
23 R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 175, interpretation betrays that he 
thinks that in the first part, novhma has an active sense, while from 132 C 9 onwards it 
signifies «the content of an act of thinking». Although, this is not made explicit by 
Allen himself, the assumption that novhma changes its meaning underlies his whole 
interpretation. Cfr. below pp. 326-7 with note 67. 
24 For the meaning of these verbals cfr. H.W. SMYTH, Greek Grammar, cit., § 
472: «Verbals in -tov", -thv, tovn either (1) have the meaning of a perfect passive partici-
ple, as kruptov" hidden, paideutov" educated, or (2) express possibility, as nohtov" thinkable, 
oJratov" visible. Many have either signification, but some are passive only, as poihtov" 
done. a. Usually passive in meaning are verbals from deponent verbs, as mimhtov" imi-
tated. b. Usually active in meaning are compounds derived from transitive active 
verbs; but some intransitive verbs make active verbals, as rJutov" flowing. c. Many are 
active or passive, others only active: memptov" blamed, blamable, blaming, pistov" trusting 
in (rare), trusted, a[prakto" doing nothing, not done, fqegktov" sounding». 
25 I. SCHUDOMA, Platons ‘Parmenides’, Kommentar und Deutung, Würzburg 
2001, p. 24: «Das Wortspiel läßt sich im Deutschen kaum wiedergeben. noema ist 
sowohl der Denkakt wie auch das Gedachte als Ergebnis des Denkens; anoetos kann 
nicht-denkend heißen oder auch gedankenlos, unsinning, töricht (so der normale 
Sprachgebrauch bei Platon)». 
26 “Thoughtless”, which is used by some translators, is not really appropriate, 
since it has the connotation “careless of consequences or other’s feelings” which cannot 
be found in the Greek verbal. 
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is used only half as often. It usually means “not understanding”, 
“unintelligent”, “senseless” or “silly” and it can be said, for example, 
of persons or of an opinion (dovxa). Thus, if I say of a person that he 
or she is ajnovhto", it is implied that this person does not make suffi-
cient use of his/her nou`"/intelligence. (3) R.W. Smyth observes that 
verbals that are formed from transitive verbs (in our case noei`n) usu-
ally are active27. (4) Given that novhma means “thought process” in 
the text in question (as was argued for above), we cannot possibly 
translate ajnovhto" by “not thought” or “unthinkable”28. Only if we 
agree with Allen that novhma in the final paradox (132 C 9-11) signi-
fies «the content of the act(s) of thinking», would such a meaning 
seem to be admissable29. That Allen’s reading of the passage is, how-
ever, unsound will be shown below. Finally, it should be noted that 
ajnovhto" is used in our passage in opposition to noei`n (132 C 11). 
That quite naturally entails that it also means the opposite, namely 




Of Thoughts and their Objects. An Analysis of the First Argument (A) 
 
Parmenides’ reasoning takes its start from the insight that 
every thought has an object that is (a2)30. This “is”, however needs 
 
27 H.W. SMYTH, Greek Grammar, cit., § 472. 
28 This is the translation of R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit. A parallel for 
ajnovhto" signifying “unthinkable” can be found in PARM. fr. 8, 17, where the word 
appears together with ajnwvnumo". 
29 See R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 177, and the discussion of his in-
terpretation below. 
30 For structurally identical arguments in Plato, cfr. soph. 244 C-D, where we 
read that every name is a name of something, that is, every name signifies something 
that is. R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 169, compares the two passages. Ac-
cording to him, the parallel in the Sophist «provides a further reason why the historical 
Parmenides cannot be identified with the Parmenides of the dialogue», since the par-
allel argument in the soph. (244 C-D) is directed against the historical Parmenides. In 
resp. V 476 E, we find the same statement as regards knowledge (gnẁsi"). The whole 
argument (476 E 4 ff.) is most convincingly analysed by J.A. PALMER, Plato’s Reception 
 
PLATO’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONCEPTUALISM 315 
 
to be qualified, and two main readings seem admissable31. The first 
claims that the object of thought simply refers to the Platonic 
Forms. The second reading tries to show that the objects of 
thought are not the transcendent Forms, but common elements 
on/over (ejpiv) individuals, which human thought unifies into one 
object of thought or one Form32. The first interpretation was ini-
tially formulated by H. Rochol33: 
 
«[The argument] means that thought, exact scientific and philoso-
phical thinking [...] must necessarily have an objectively existing 
object, the Ideas, the existent Ones34». 
 
Rochol’s interpretation has the advantage that it outrightly ex-
cludes the following objection35. One could claim that Parmenides’ 
argument is not valid, since, for instance, goat-stags or griffins do 
not exist, although we can, admittedly, think of them. The answer 
to such an objection would be that, from a Platonic perspective, 
 
of Parmenides, cit., pp. 31-55. He points out that against the non-Platonists, who are 
called “lovers of sights and sounds”, the reasoning is not compelling, since it already 
presupposes the existence of Platonic Forms. And again, in the Theaetetus 188 E ff., a 
similar argument is employed with regard to dovxa. 
31 S. SCOLNICOV, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 64, calling the contents of thought 
“real” does not commit himself to either of the two readings. For his “real” would 
likewise have to be qualified further. 
32 From Proclus’ commentary we can infer that in Antiquity also a third possi-
bility was discussed, namely that tinov" refers to an agent who thinks the thought, cfr. 
PROCL. in Parm. IV 899.11-7 Cousin. This interpretation of the passage was champi-
oned, as Proclus tells us, by philosophers who put forth a conceptualist interpretation 
of Platonic Forms (o{soi me;n ta;" ijdeva" nohvsei" ei\nai yila;" uJpevlabon, in Parm. V 899. 
11-2). Hence, with this somewhat peculiar reading, they wanted to defend themselves 
against Parmenides’ criticism. 
33 K. DORTER, Form and Good cit., pp. 34-7, and F. FERRARI, Platone. Parmenide, 
cit., pp. 80-1, seemingly agree with him. 
34 H. ROCHOL, The Dialogue ‘Parmenides’. An insoluble Enigma in Platonism?, «In-
ternational Philosophical Quarterly», XI (1971) p. 506. 
35 Such an objection is formulated by Fronterotta in G. CAMBIANO-F. 
FRONTEROTTA, Platone. Parmenide, Roma-Bari 2000 (first edition 1998), p. 113 note 
26. Cfr. also F. FRONTEROTTA, Mevqexi". La teoria platonica delle idee e la partecipazione 
delle cose empiriche, Pisa 2001, p. 225 note 2. 
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griffins and goat-stags are not the objects of a novhma, they are rather 
the objects of imagination (fantasiva)36. Moreover, the examples of 
virtues, like justice or piety, would also not undermine Parmenides’ 
argument, since for a Platonist these really exist. There are Forms of 
justice and piety37. 
Furthermore, in resp. V 467 D we find a similar use of “to be” 
(ei\nai) in the sense of “really existing” and an argument that comes 
rather close to Rochol’s reading. Socrates argues there that knowl-
edge (gnẁsi") must necessarily have an object that is. He goes on to 
identify this object with the transcendent Forms, which are the only 
entities (with the probable exception of the gods) that really are38. 
The parallel reasoning seems to confirm the strong or ontological 
reading of ei\nai in the passage of the Parmenides39. On the other 
hand, such a strong reading also presents certain difficulties. For 
instance, by no means does Plato always use novhma in its technical 
sense. Moreover, such a reading would make Parmenides the 
mouthpiece of Plato’s doctrine of the Forms, since by claiming that 
a thought must be of something that really is, he would be an or-
thodox Platonist40. 
It depends on how we interpret Parmenides’ criticism. Do his 
arguments reveal something about the true nature of the Forms41? 
 
36 Cfr. G. CAMBIANO-F. FRONTEROTTA, Platone. Parmenide, cit., p. 113 note 26. 
37 Cfr. again ibid. 
38 The argument is analysed by J.A. PALMER, Plato’s Reception of Parmenides, cit., 
pp. 31-55; cfr. note 30 above. 
39 That is, “being” as “really existing”. 
40 This is indeed the view of H. ROCHOL, The Dialogue ‘Parmenides’ cit., p. 509, 
who claims that the Parmenides of the dialogue is «as good a Platonist as Plato him-
self and a much better one than young Socrates». The scholars who hold that the 
Parmenides of the dialogue is identical with the historical Parmenides (cfr. note 13 
above) would certainly disagree with Rochol’s assertion. 
41 This is, for instance, Proclus’ view who finds in Parmenides’ “criticism” a 
maieutical procedure. He is, however, far from agreeing with Rochol’s interpretation. 
For Proclus’ maieutical interpretation of Parmenides’ criticism cfr. C. STEEL, 
L’Anagogie cit., and M. ERLER, Platons Schriftkritik und der Sinn der Aporien im ‘Par-
menides’ nach Platon und Proklos, in J. PÉPIN-H.D. SAFFREY (éds.), Proclus. Lecteur et in-
terprète des Anciens, Actes du colloque international du CNRS (Paris, 2-4 octobre 
1985), Paris 1987, pp. 153-63. 
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This is not improbable, since in the end of his criticism Parmenides 
states that one should not abandon the theory of Forms, for then all 
dialectical discourse (dialevgesqai) would be impossible42. 
Yet, other objections can be raised against Rochol’s interpreta-
tion. Firstly, although he claims that Parmenides’ argument con-
cludes from the existence of thinking to the existence of an objectively 
existing object of thinking, that is, the Forms43, nowhere in the 
text is this explicitly stated. Secondly, if it really were Parmenides’ 
aim to show that a thought «must necessarily have an objectively 
existing object, the Ideas», as Rochol claims, why did he not say so? 
Of course, one could assume that he is just sowing clues, so that 
Socrates might eventually reach an understanding of the Forms. 
Such an interpretation is, for instance, defended by the Neoplato-
nist Proclus44. 
However, let us again remember what it is that Parmenides 
wants to show. He wants to show that a Form cannot be a thought, 
but must be an object of thought, a noouvmenon (Ac). In order to do 
so, he argues that a thought is a thought of something that is (a2). 
In the final step (a3), he identifies this object of thought with a unity 
that is over “all things/entities/participants/cases” (ejpi; pàsin)45. In the 
event that he really intended to show that this unity ought to be 
identified with an “objectively existing Idea”, he would, I think, have 
phrased his words differently. Most importantly, consider that the 
unity spoken of here, is not a characteristic of the Form itself, which 
in the strong reading it should be, but that it is thought that 
brings this unity about (to; noouvmenon e}n ei\nai, Parm. 132 C 6; 
a3’)46. If Parmenides wanted to imply that the Platonic Forms are 
 
42 Parm. 135 B-C. 
43 H. ROCHOL, The Dialogue ‘Parmenides’ cit., pp. 506-7: «[T]his theory, con-
cluding from the existence of thinking to the existence of an objectively existing ob-
ject, is at the same time the gist and the basic theory of Platonism». This sentence is 
quoted, with approval, by K. DORTER, Form and Good cit., p. 35 note 21, and F. 
FERRARI, Platone. Parmenide, cit., p. 81 note 149. 
44 Cfr. note 41 above. 
45 Cfr. note 47. I intentionally leave the meaning of the Greek phrase open here. 
46 Against this reading of the text, it has been objected that the Greek here does 
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the objects of thought (noouvmena), he would certainly not have said 
that their unity is brought about by thought (a3’). Platonic Forms 
are by definition unitary and their unity surely does not depend on 
human minds. In the passage in question, however, they are not 
unitary by themselves, they are only unitary qua being an object of 
thought. Generally speaking, one can say that in the first three 
ajporivai the Forms are not really separate from their participants. 
Only in ajporiva four, where the Forms are said to be paradigms in 
nature, does this radically change. From that point on, they, as it 
were, transcend their participants. 
For these reasons, it seems more plausible to turn to the sec-
ond reading, that does not claim that the object of thoughts are the 
transcendent Platonic Forms, but that they are identified with 
common elements on/over (ejpiv) individuals. This entails that Par-
menides is merely aiming to refute Socrates’ suggestion by a reductio 
ad absurdum (see especially the final part of the argument, Parm. 132 
C 9-11 and 132 C 12: ajll∆ oujde; toùto, favnai, e[cei lovgon). There is 
ample evidence that the first argument (A) not only distinguishes 
between thought and the object of thought, but further aims to 
show that this object points in fact to something outside the soul 
(g2)47. This clearly emerges from the expression that the thought 
 
not necessarily imply that the unity in question is brought about by thought. How-
ever, it is significant, I think, that Plato uses the phrase to; noouvmenon e}n ei\nai; and we 
have to ask ourselves why he does so. I agree that the Greek might be understood in a 
different way (i.e. “which is assumed / taken to be one”), but my reading of the text is 
certainly possible as well and the whole argument suggests to understand noeìsqai in 
the same lines as novhma before. 
47 Although this was strongly disputed by R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., 
pp. 170-2 and 174-5, his attempt to demonstrate that in the phrase “a thought of 
something” (novhmav tino"), “of something” should be taken as a genitive of definition 
or content and should point to the intentional object of thought was not successful. 
Cfr. the discussion of Allen’s interpretation below. That Parmenides’ argument con-
cludes, in fact, from thought to an object outside the mind was pointed out, for in-
stance, by F.M. CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides cit., p. 91, M.F. BURNYEAT, Idealism 
and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed, «The Philosophical Re-
view», XCI (1982) p. 21, and G. FINE, On Ideas. Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of 
Forms, Oxford 1993, pp. 132-3. In principle, I agree with these scholars, but at the 
same time propose to qualify their statement. With his argument, Parmenides does 
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thinks a unity that is on/over all these instances (ejpi; pa`sin ejpovn), 
where pa`sin should be understood as all the participants (pa`sin toi`" 
metevcousin)48. This realist reading of the argument can be paralleled 
by two similar expressions in ajporiva one and two. In the first pas-
sage, it is said that, given that a Form can be compared with a sail, 
this sail spread over many people is a e}n ejpi; polloì", and it is taken 
for granted that the people in question represent the participants. 
In the second ajporiva, the participants are likewise termed pavnta; 
moreover, it is said there that a Form like “largeness” origi-
nates/appears in the human soul if we look over the many large 
things, that is the things that participate in “largeness” (ejpi; pavnta 
ijdei`n)49. This reading is warranted by other Platonic passages. 
ejpei`nai, for instance, can be used in a concrete sense, that is of a col-
our being on a surface (Lys. 217 C). In Hipp. ma. 300 A-B, the verb 
 
not conclude stricto sensu that the object of thought is outside the mind, but points out 
that it refers to something that is outside the mind (i.e. to something on/over [ejpiv] the 
participants). Both Socrates and Parmenides can be taken to agree, however, that these 
participants exist outside the mind. 
48 This is also the interpretation of K.M. SAYRE, Parmenides’ Lesson. Translation 
and Explication of Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, Notre Dame (Indiana) 1996, pp. 83-4. Note, 
however, that Proclus supplies not toì" metevcousin, but toì" ei[desin. The reasons for 
this lie in his complex interpretation of the different ajporivai as finally leading to a 
true insight into the nature of the Forms; cfr. C. STEEL, L’Anagogie cit. A discussion of 
Proclus’ interpretation would, however, go far beyond the scope of this paper. Yet an-
other interpretation of ejpi; pàsin is provided by G. FINE, On Ideas cit., p. 133: «Plato 
makes it plain that forms are ‘over all these cases’, i.e. they are general or shared». 
From the context of her reconstruction of the argument, however, it emerges that she 
understands it along the same lines as Sayre, since she explicitly speaks about shared 
properties or shared forms in things, that is, in participants. 
49 It is rewarding to quote Waddell’s observation ad loc., see PLATWNOS 
PARMENIDHS. The ‘Parmenides’ of Plato, ed. by W.W. WADDELL, Glasgow 1894 
(repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1975): «ejpi; pavnta with ijdeìn does not seem to be a common 
phrase with Pl[ato]; L[iddell] and S[cott] quote Iliad XXIII, 143 ijdw;n ejp∆ oi[nopa 
povnton». It seems that ejpi- here has the force of an “over-view” or a generalisation. It 
is not a detailed observation but rather a generalisation through sight. The same force 
of ejpi- can, I think, be found in words like ejpilogismov", for which cfr. EPICUR. ep. I 
72-3, sent. 20 and 22 (with M. SCHOFIELD, Epilogismos: An Appraisal, in M. FREDE-G. 
STRIKER (eds), Rationality in Greek Thought, Oxford 1996, pp. 221-37) and PLOT. I 3 
[20] 6, 10 ff. 
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is said of a common element (koinovn) that makes both a sound and a 
sight (o[yi") beautiful. 
 
«Thus both [scil. a sound and a sight] possess something, which is 
the same, that makes that they are both beautiful, namely this 
common element (to; koino;n tou`to) which is likewise on both of 
them commonly (e[pesti koinh/`) and on every single one separately. 
For otherwise, I think, both together and each one on its own 
would not be beautiful»50. 
 
Consider, finally, the following parallel from the Symposium 
(from the famous ascent to the Form of the beautiful). 
 
«A lover who goes about this matter correctly must begin in his 
youth to devote himself to beautiful bodies. First, if the leader leads 
aright, he should love one body and beget beautiful ideas there; 
then he should realize that the beauty of any one body is brother to 
the beauty of any other (to; kavllo" to; ejpi ; oJtw/ou`n swvmati tw/` ejpi; 
eJtevrw/ swvmati ajdelfovn ejsti) and that if he is to pursue beauty of 
form (to; ejp∆ ei[dei kalovn) he’d be very foolish not to think that the 
beauty of all bodies is one and the same (e{n te kai; taujto;n hJgei`sqai 
to; ejpi; pa`sin toi`" swvmasi kavllo")»51. 
 
The parallel is rather striking. First, we note the already famil-
iar expression ejpiv + dat. referring to an attribute or common ele-
ment on sensible individuals. Moreover, the idea that these com-
mon elements are unified in thought is present too (e{n te kai; 
taujto;n hJgei`sqai to; ejpi; pa`sin toi`" swvmasi kavllo"). If we look at a 
manifold of beautiful individuals we have to realise that their beauty 
 
50 “Ecousin a[ra ti to; aujto; o} poieì aujta;" kala;" ei\nai, to; koino;n toùto, o} kai; 
ajmfotevrai" aujtaì" e[pesti koinh/` kai; eJkatevra/ ijdiva/: ouj ga;r a[n pou a[llw" ajmfovteraiv ge 
kalai; h\san kai; eJkatevra (300 A-B). 
51 Symp. 210 A 4-B 3: deì gavr, e[fh, to;n ojrqẁ" ijovnta ejpi; toùto to; pràgma 
a[rcesqai me;n nevon o[nta ijevnai ejpi; ta; kala; swvmata, kai; prẁton mevn, eja;n ojrqẁ" hJgh̀tai 
oJ hJgouvmeno", eJno;" aujto;n swvmato" ejràn kai; ejntaùqa gennàn lovgou" kalouv", e[peita de; 
aujto;n katanoh̀sai o{ti to; kavllo" to; ejpi; oJtw/oùn swvmati tw/` ejpi; eJtevrw/ swvmati ajdelfovn 
ejsti, kai; eij deì diwvkein to; ejp∆ ei[dei kalovn, pollh; a[noia mh; oujc e{n te kai; taujto;n 
hJgeìsqai to; ejpi; pàsin toì" swvmasi kavllo": (translated by A. Nehamas and P. 
Woodruff). For this use of ejpiv see also Men. 75 A 4 and A 8. 
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is “akin”. This is so, because it has a common source, the Form of 
beauty. This is why “the beauty of all bodies is one and the same”, 
that is, there is only one Form of beauty. Note, once again, that it is 
thought that recognises this unity. 
However, against this interpretation of e}n ejpi; polloi`" or e}n 
ejpi; pàsin a strong argument can be adduced. It could be claimed 
that since Aristotle and Alexander refer to the Platonic Forms as a e}n 
ejpi; pollẁn, the phrase e}n ejpi; polloì" or e}n ejpi; pa`sin «must have 
seemed to be not an inappropriate expression to use of the separate 
ideas but an intentional reference to them»52. This argument pro-
vides a most interesting objection and it seems to overturn the pre-
ceding reasoning. However, three points can be put forth in order 
to seriously question its validity. First, the phrase e}n ejpi; pollẁn, 
used by Aristotle and Alexander to refer to the transcendent Pla-
tonic Forms, is in fact different from the formulation employed in 
the Parmenides (e}n ejpi; polloì") in that it should be understood as e}n 
ejpi; pollẁn kathgorouvmenon (a unity that is predicated of many in-
dividuals). Thus, the phrase rather expresses a logical relation. What 
Aristotle and Alexander are critising is, of course, that Plato has 
separated these predicates/universals. Second, we should not forget 
that the dramatic purpose of the Parmenides consists in pointing to a 
stage of the theory of Forms in which the theory itself is still the 
subject of considerable discussion and modification. Against this 
background, the parallel usage of ejpiv that can be found in the first 
two ajporivai (referred to above) is certainly of more importance than 
later references to the theory of Forms that consider it a fully devel-
oped doctrine. We can add to this that up to the present day it re-
mains an open question whether Aristotle’s and Alexander’s repre-
 
52 Cfr. H. CHERNISS, Lafrance on Doxa, «Dialogue», XXII (1983) pp. 146-7. It 
should be said that Cherniss is commenting here on an interpretation of the Theaetetus 
(184 B 5-186 E 12). The argument could, however, also be applied to the passage in 
Plato’s Parmenides that constitutes the focus of our investigation. The remarks of 
Cherniss on the usage of ejpiv in the context of the Platonic theory of Forms remain 
fundamental. 
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sentation of the Plato’s theory of Forms is in all or most respects 
adequate53. 
Note, finally and most importantly, that Cherniss’ claim that 
e}n ejpi; polloì" or e}n ejpi; pa`sin can be seen as an “intentional refer-
ence” to Platonic Forms is not convincing. The passage in the 
Theaetetus which he appealed to is situated in the section on common 
elements (koinav) which are said to be perceived by the soul all by it-
self. Now, Cherniss’ claim presupposes that we identify the koinav in 
the Theaetetus passage with transcendent Forms. This, however, 
seems rather unlikely given that in the examples of koinav also “non-
being” figures. In his recent commentary on the dialogue, D. Sedley 
calls the koinav “the commons”, “common predicates”, “a priori predi-
cates”, “predicable of sensible properties”54. 
At this point, let us come back to our text. It can be said that 
we do not learn in our passage how or why the human soul is able 
 
53 On this point, cfr. the comprehensive study of G. FINE, On Ideas cit. D.T. 
DEVEREUX, Separation and Immanence in Plato’s Theory of Forms, «Oxford Studies in An-
cient Philosophy», XII (1994) pp. 85-8, argues that the use of ejpiv in the first part of 
the Parmenides would point to the fact that the Forms are separate from their partici-
pants. He is, however, confusing two different issues. First, we can state that in the 
first ajporiva it is shown that Forms cannot be in their participants. This entails, quite 
naturally, that from ajporiva two onwards, Forms are no longer said to be in the par-
ticipants, but rather on/over (ejpiv) them (like the sail is on/over the individuals covered 
by it). Second, this does not mean, however, that the Forms would already be truly 
separated, since such an interpretation cannot be extracted from the text. That this is, 
however, what Devereux meant is already indicated in the title of his article. Only 
from ajporiva four onwards are the Forms really separated from their participants, be-
cause they are said to exist as paradigms in nature. My impression is that Plato uses ejpiv 
in the Parmenides and elsewhere, because it does not imply a commitment as to how 
the Forms are related to their participants. That they are, however, not entirely sepa-
rate from them is clearly shown by ajporiva three, given that our interpretation is cor-
rect. In this context, it is most remarkable that also Aristotle uses similar language 
when referring to the (Aristotelian) Forms in matter, see metaph. Z 11. 1036 a 31 
(ejpigivgnesqai ejpiv) and the parallel passages collected by M. FREDE-G. PATZIG, Aristo-
teles ‘Metaphysik Z’, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, München 1988, ad loc. This 
clearly shows that also for Aristotle the use of ejpiv did not necessarily refer to separate 
or transcendent Forms. 
54 See D. SEDLEY, The Midwife of Platonism, Text and Subtext in Plato’s ‘Theaetetus’, 
Oxford 2004, pp. 106-7, 112, 115-6, 159. Sedley agrees that the “commons” are not 
yet Platonic Forms (p. 115), and once (p. 107) refers to them as concepts. 
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to unify these objects in thought or even to think them. Later, dif-
ferent models were suggested as to how this may work, the most 
prominent of them are abstraction and collection55. We should ab-
stain, of course, from reading all of this into the Parmenides passage, 
but it has become clear, I hope, that there is something going on 
which would need further clarification either on Plato’s or Par-
menides’ part, namely how thoughts or concepts can come into be-
ing in the human mind (ejggivgnesqai, Parm. 132 B 4-5). If we look 
at other dialogues in Plato’s œuvre, it becomes plain that he does not 
endorse any kind of abstractionism56. With Plato, as Cherniss put it, 
«[Forms] were the objective correlates of the mental concepts and it is 
their objective existence that makes all abstraction possible»57. 
To sum up, Parmenides demonstrates that a Form cannot be a 
thought process, but must be an object of thought (Ac)58. At this 
point, one should recall that Socrates wanted to safeguard the unity 
of a Form with his suggestion. Reading the first part of Parmenides’ 
refutation, it becomes clear that unity plays an eminent role as the 
argument proceeds. It is not the case, however, that Parmenides ar-
 
55 Cfr. A. DE LIBERA, L’art des généralités. Théories de l’abstraction, Paris 1999. 
56 Cfr. R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., pp. 176-7, and CH. HELMIG, What 
is the Systematic Place of Abstraction and Concept Formation in Plato’s Philosophy? Ancient 
and Modern Readings of ‘Phaedrus’ 249b-c, in G. VAN RIEL-C. MACÉ (eds), Platonic Ideas 
and Concept Formation in Ancient and Medieval Thought (“Ancient and Medieval Philoso-
phy”, Series I, XXXII), Leuven 2004, pp. 83-97. 
57 H. CHERNISS, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, cit., I, pp. 214-6 
note 128. 
58 Recently, S.C. RICKLESS, Plato’s Forms in Transition cit., pp. 75-80, has pro-
posed a different reading of the argument. Assuming that the argument has two parts, 
he claims that the result of the first argument is an infinite regress. In this way, he 
wants to connect it to the previous argument (first Third Man argument). Rickless 
writes «the result that every form is a thought of a form generates an infinite regress of 
forms» (p. 77). However, such a reading is not very likely, because (1) nowhere the 
text points to a regress (while in the two Third Man arguments the regress is always 
clearly marked), (2) nowhere it is said that a form is actually a thought of a form (this 
is merely an inference by Rickless), (3) rather, it seems that Parmenides shows by 
means of a reduction that a Form cannot be a thought (novhma), but must be an object 
of thought (noouvmenon), (4) finally, it is not even clear why or how the argument 
could generate an infinite regress (pace Rickless). 
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gues that in identifying Forms and thoughts the unity of the 
Forms would be done away with. Quite the contrary is true. He 
rather points out that the unity in question is not the thought-
process, but an object of thought (noouvmenon). This object of 
thought, which is identified with the Form, is a unity because it is 
unified by thought (to; noouvmenon e}n ei\nai, a3’). It is characterised 
(a3) as being something on/over all these instances (ejpi; pa`sin ejpovn) 
and as always the same over these instances (ajei; o]n to; aujto; ejpi; 
pa`sin). As I have tried to argue above, this means that the object of 
thought in question is not a mere mental entity (g1), but originates 
from or depends on a common element that is over/on (ejpiv) the 
many participants. It is an object of thought in the sense of (g2). 
Hence, it has, as it were, a fundamentum in re. 
 
 
Forms as Causes. An Analysis of the Second Argument (B) 
 
The second argument (B) is considerably shorter than the first. 
It takes its start from Socrates’ initial suggestion that Forms are 
thoughts, that is, thought processes (b1)59. If the Forms are 
thoughts the participants would all think, which in the case of, say, 
sticks and stones would be obvious nonsense. On the other hand, it 
is likewise absurd if everything participates in Forms (thoughts) 
and does not think (ajnovhto"). The argument presupposes what was 
said in Parm. 129 A 3-6, namely that the participants become like 
the Forms (b2). What makes this second argument slightly prob-
lematic is the phrase ejk nohmavtwn e{kaston ei\nai (132 C 10-1). It 
suggests that everything (all the participants) consist of thoughts. 
However, it was already stated in 131 E 3-7 that a Form cannot be 
in the participant. I think that we cannot fully account for this in-
 
59 Note that R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., would not agree at this point, 
since he interprets the refutation of Parmenides as being a continuous whole. Accord-
ing to him, the passage that corresponds to my second argument (B) starts off with 
the result reached, namely that a Form (as novhma/noouvmenon) is a “content of an act of 
thinking”. See the detailed discussion of Allen’s reading below. 
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consistency, but it does certainly not affect the argument as such. 
For the implied meaning is that everything participates in 
thoughts and hence becomes “thought-like”60. Against this back-
ground, its seems reasonable to term argument (B) the argument 
from participation or causation. After this analysis of the two argu-
ments, let us now turn to Allen’s reading of the passage. 
 
 
Allen’s Reading of Parm. 132 B 3-C 11 
 
In a rather influential article, which was later reproduced in his 
important commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, Allen contested the 
classical interpretation of the Parmenides passage61. According to Al-
len one should not distinguish two arguments62. The whole passage, 
he explains, ought to be read as forming one single continuous ar-
gument.63 Moreover, the classical interpretation, as summarized 
above, would imply an «act/object distinction of twentieth-century 
realistic epistemology»64. 
 
60 Cfr. above note 16. 
61 A first version of his interpretation was published as an article: R.E. ALLEN, 
Ideas as Thoughts: ‘Parmenides’ 132b-c, «Ancient Philosophy», I (1980-81) pp. 29-38. 
Later, he incorporated the revised article in his monograph, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., 
pp. 167-79. 
62 On the whole, L. BRISSON, Platon. Parménide, cit., pp. 39-41, agrees with Al-
len’s reading. M. MIGLIORI, Dialettica e Verità. Commentario filosofico al ‘Parmenide’ di 
Platone, Pref. di H. KRÄMER, Introd. di G. REALE, Milano 1990, pp. 146-8, attitude 
towards Allen’s interpretation remains somewhat unclear; see especially p. 147 note 
45. It is rather surprising that F. FRONTEROTTA, Mevqexi" cit., p. 225 note 4, can 
claim that both Allen and Brisson interpret the passage as a refutation of conceptual-
ism («una formidabile confutazione del concettualismo epistemologico»). In fact, es-
pecially Allen maintains exactly the opposite. It seems that also S. SCOLNICOV, Plato’s 
‘Parmenides’, cit., pp. 63-4, reads the passage as consisting of one single argument, al-
though he does not say that explicitly. Finally, S.C. RICKLESS, Plato’s Forms in Transi-
tion cit., pp. 75-80, clearly distinguishes two separate arguments. 
63 R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 174: «Parmenides’ argument is pre-
sented as one and continuous, with its refutative conclusion offered at the end, not as 
two separate arguments, one of which shows that the object of thought exists inde-
pendently of the act of thinking». 
64 Ibid., p. 178. 
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Allen does not say exactly what this means. He is certainly pre-
pared to admit that the passage does provide a distinction between 
the act of thinking and the content of thought, but he does not want 
to grant that this content of thought exists independently of minds. 
 
«The argument does indeed provide a distinction between the act of 
thinking and the content of thought, but in no way suggests or im-
plies that the content of thought exists independently of minds»65. 
 
Thus, what Allen so firmly criticises is that the distinction be-
tween the act of thinking (novhma) and the object of this thought 
(noouvmenon) implies that the latter refers to something that exists 
outside a mind. I have classified such an understanding of the 
meaning of “object of thought” above as (g2). Therefore, Allen is 
anxious to stress that the noouvmenon is rather the content of thought 
and that in the phrase novhmav tino" (cfr. Parm. 132 B 11), the tino" 
should be understood as a genitive of definition66. The content of 
thought is, according to Allen, still in a soul (g1). 
Allen’s long commentary on the passage is quite remarkable, 
since he is the only scholar who has tried to discuss the argument 
extensively and to point to its philosophical implications. As noted, 
it is characteristic of his reading of the passage that he sees it as one 
single continuous argument, in which novhma first carries an active 
meaning (process of thinking), but is later used in the passive 
meaning («contents of an act of thinking»)67. This shift of meaning of 
 
65 Ibid., p. 176. 
66 Ibid., pp. 171-2: «To sum up. The genitive in “thought of something” must 
be definitory, and may be objective. If it is also objective, it need not be taken to im-
ply that some thoughts are not thoughts of themselves, or that objects of thought do 
not depend on thinking for their existence». For the different interpretations of tino" 
that have been suggested, cfr. above p. 315 with note 32. 
67 Although this is not made explicit by Allen himself, it clearly emerges from 
the following assertion: «Parmenides at this point [scil. Parm. 132 C 8, end of the first 
argument (A) according to the classical interpretation] has forced the distinction be-
tween the activity of thinking and the content of thought. The content of thought is 
an Idea, one over many. It follows that since sensibles partake of Ideas, and Ideas are 
thoughts, sensibles partake of thoughts, that is, the contents of acts of thinking» (ibid., p. 
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novhma necessarily follows from reading the passage as constituting 
one single argument. Allen explicitly attacks an interpretation that 
finds in the passage a refutation of conceptualism, for he does not 
want to concede that the object of thinking (noouvmenon) is mind in-
dependent or refers to something that is mind independent (g2)68. 
As far as the first part of the passage is concerned (132 B 3-C 
8), Allen’s reading is identical with the interpretation given above 
(A). Given the conclusion (Ac) that Forms are not thoughts, but ob-
jects of thought (noouvmena), Allen assumes that from now on also 
novhma means «object of thought», i.e. «the content of an act of 
thinking». In other words, whereas according to the classical inter-
pretation a new argument (B) begins at 132 C 9, Allen assumes that 
the first argument continues. But since the result reached in (Ac) is 
that the Forms are not thoughts, but objects of thought, Allen is 
forced to take novhma in 132 C 10-1 to mean “object of thought” or 
“the content of an act of thinking”. For otherwise the crucial dis-
tinction between novhma and noouvmenon would not be employed in 
the final part of the passage. The classical interpretation, on the 
other hand, does not allow for such a shift of meaning. It rather 
concludes that since a Form is said to be the object of thought 
(noouvmenon) and not the thought/thought process itself (novhma), 
Socrates’ suggestion is shown to be pointless. Accordingly, the re-
mainder of the passage introduces a second argument (B), the ar-
gument “from participation/causation”. 
Returning to Allen’s reading, we can state that he wants to de-
tect a shift of meaning of novhma in the argument. For him, the pas-
sage forms a continuous whole. In a first step, novhma is eventually 
determined as the object of thought (noouvmenon). In a second step, 
the absurd consequences of this are then pointed out. This reading 
has the clear advantage that it can explain the phrase novhma noei` 
(132 C 3), which for scholars who assume that novhma throughout 
carries a passive meaning poses a real difficulty. 
 
177, Italics are mine). 
68 In particular cfr. ibid., pp. 170-2 and 174-5. 
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Furthermore, against Cornford he objects that tiv de; dhv; (132 C 
9) would not have the force of introducing a new argument69. How-
ever, this is not very compelling, since the phrase tiv de; dhv… occurs 
rather frequently in Plato and it is clear from parallel passages that 
Plato does use it to introduce a new point in the discussion. Thus, 
just before our passage we find the sentence tiv de; dhv… pro;" tovde pẁ" 
e[cei"; (131 E 8) to introduce the second ajporiva70. The remainder of 
Allen’s reconstruction can be summarised as follows: 
 
(I) 1. Everything participates in the Forms. 
 2. The Forms are nohvmata, i.e. the contents/results of acts of 
 thinking. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Everything participates in the contents/results of acts of thinking. 
 
(II) 1. The Form is in the participants either in whole or in 
 part71. 
 2. A thought (contents/result of an act of thinking) can 
 only exist in a soul. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 The participant itself must be a soul. 
 
Hence, every participant, being soul, must think, but this is 
obviously impossible in the case of sticks or stones (or other inani-
mate entities), which also participate. Allen concedes that the final 
 
69 Ibid., p. 174. This was justly criticised by M.H. MILLER, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’ cit., 
p. 216 note 37. The rest of Miller’s critique of Allen is, however, flawed by the fact that 
he is convinced that novhma, or more generally the Greek nouns ending in -ma, refer to 
the result or product of an action. However, as was shown above, this is untenable. 
Secondly, Miller misrepresents Allen’s interpretation when he writes that Allen would 
interpret novhma exclusively as the “act of thinking”. As far as I can see, apart from 
Miller’s response not much has been said about Allen’s reading of the passage. The only 
scholar who criticised Allen’s overall conclusion was Fronterotta (in G. CAMBIANO-F. 
FRONTEROTTA, Platone. Parmenide, cit., p. 113 note 26), without, however, going into 
further details. 
70 For tiv dev; as introducing a new argument see R. KÜHNER-B. GERTH, Aus-
führliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre, Zweiter Band, 3. 
Auflage, Hannover-Leipzig 1904, § 531.3. 
71 Parm. 131 A 4-6. 
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step of the argument allows two readings that are both equally ad-
missable, depending as to how one determines the sense of ajnovhto" 
(132 C 11). 
 
(III’) Thus, if thoughts are only in souls and thoughts are in things 
which do not think, then such things must be stupid or uncon-
scious (ajnovhto" in an active sense)72. 
(III’’) Or thoughts in things which are not thinking are unthought 
or not thinkable (ajnovhto" in a passive sense)73. 
 
Finally, Allen affirms: 
 
«This refutation would be impossible if Ideas had already been 
proved to exist separately from minds; the argument so far from re-
quiring the act/object distinction of twentieth century realistic epis-
temology, precludes it. For Parmenides’ refutation turns on the assump-
tion that Ideas are in their participants, and that therefore thoughts are in 
their participants if Ideas are thoughts»74. 
 
Allen’s interpretation, and this becomes clear at first sight, is 
much more complicated than the classical reading of the text, de-
fended, for instance, by Cornford. The first part of his reconstruc-
tion is identical with that of his predecessors. From 132 C 6-7 on-
wards, however, Allen assumes that the conclusion reached, namely 
that a novhma is not a thought process, but rather a noouvmenon, will 
be used also in the rest of the argument, and that novhma from now 
on means “the contents of an act of thought”. The classical interpre-
tation, on the other hand, assumed (1) that novhma, throughout the 
passage, carries the meaning “thought-process”, and that (2) 
noouvmenon, as content of thought, would refer to something outside 
 
72 R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 177: «ajnovhta has an active meaning: 
if thoughts are present only in minds, and thoughts are present in things that do not 
think, those things must be stupid or unconscious». 
73 Ibid., p. 178: «On the other hand, ajnovhta also has a passive meaning: 
thoughts in things that do not think are unthought or unthinkable – much too deep 
for tears». 
74 Ibid. (Italics are mine). 
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the soul, namely to a common element on/over (ejpiv) the many par-
ticipants (g2). This noouvmenon is a unity, because it is unified in 
thought (to; noouvmenon e}n ei\nai). 
To integrate Parmenides’ final paradox within the framework 
of his reading, Allen has to introduce a series of additional pre-
misses. In fact, the entire second syllogism (II) consists of premisses 
that cannot be derived from the text, namely that (II.1) the Form is 
in the participants either in whole or in part, and that (II.2) a 
thought can only exist in a soul. The first premiss Allen takes from 
ajporiva one (131 A 4-6). The second premiss looks like an innocent 
common sense assumption, but in this particular context, it is not 
acceptable. By saying that a thought must be in a soul Allen out-
rightly excludes the classical reading of the last part of the passage 
(as will become clear shortly) and obscures the final paradox. For it 
is said at that point that if Forms were thoughts, everything would 
consist of thoughts (ejk nohmavtwn e{kaston [scil. tẁn metecovntwn] 
ei\nai). This entails that the participants participate in thoughts, 
but not that the participants are in a soul. Hence, the paradox is 
less complex than Allen wanted to make us believe, namely, given 
that Forms are thoughts, even, for instance, sticks and stones (or 
other inanimate beings) would be thought-like, although they ad-
mittedly do not think. 
What is more, in saying that every thought must be in a soul 
(II.2), Allen by definition excludes a realist reading of the passage, 
for two reasons. First, he neglects the distinction made in the text 
between the object of thought and thought process. For although 
he is indeed correct that an object of thought in the sense of a con-
tents of thought (g1) presupposes some kind of mental agent, this 
by no means holds true for objects of thought in the sense (g2), 
that is, objects outside the mind which constitute the content of 
thought. Second, the classical reading of the passage claims exactly 
this, namely that the objects of thought (g2) are outside the 
mind/soul. Hence, by introducing the premiss that thoughts have 
to be in souls (a premiss, it should be repeated, that cannot be 
found in the passage in question), Allen right from the start ex-
cludes the position he attempts to refute. To sum up, this addi-
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tional premiss represents the classical example of a petitio principii 
(begging the question), since his conclusion (the object of thought 
cannot be outside the soul) is already assumed by one of the 
premisses, namely by his claim that a thought must be in a soul. 
Let us, however, come back to premiss II.1, namely that the 
form is in the participant either in whole or in part. Admittedly, 
Allen can claim support for this premiss from 131 A 4-6. A careful 
reading of what follows this passage, however, shows that it is later 
refuted (131 E 3-7)75. There, it is declared to be impossible that a 
Form, either in whole or in part, could be in the participant76. 
Moreover, Allen’s reading is also unconvincing for another reason. 
His explanation of III’ and III’’ is hardly intelligible and it does not 
really clarify the paradox. To sum up, everything seems to indicate 
that it is indeed wiser to return to the classical reading of the text. 
 
 
Parmenides’ Arguments Reconsidered 
 
In the last part of my contribution, I would like to return to 
Parmenides’ reasoning in (A) and (B) and see whether the two ar-
guments can be considered valid. Most of the interpreters agree, pace 
Allen77, that the arguments are intended to refute a conceptualist 
position, namely that Forms are thoughts in the human mind. Un-
til now, argument (B) has not received much attention. As far as (A) 
is concerned, most commentators maintain that the argument is 
not valid. For from the fact that we think of something, it does not 
follow by any means that this merely intentional object exists inde-
pendently of thought. This goes without saying for objects such as 
goat-stags or golden mountains. As I have tried to show, however, 
Parmenides’ first argument (A) seems to imply that thought pre-
 
75 Cfr. K. DORTER, Form and Good in Plato’s Eleatic Dialogues, cit., p. 31 note 17, 
who points to the same mistake in Allen’s interpretation of Parm. 132 A 1-B 1 (second 
ajporiva). 
76 Pace R.E. ALLEN, Plato’s ‘Parmenides’, cit., p. 133. 
77 Ibid., pp. 174-5. 
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supposes an object/objects outside itself78. Is it, therefore, hopelessly 
flawed? I shall provide a fresh way of looking at the argument in or-
der to somewhat rehabilitate it. 
I propose to suggest that the kernel of the argument is not 
the problematic conclusion from thought to an object outside itself, 
but rather the question how a thought comes about, how the mind 
«comes to be furnished» (John Locke), how we, in other words, 
form concepts. Looked at from this perspective, the argument be-
comes much more convincing. Every thought, as thought process, 
needs an object. No one would doubt this. The question is what 
the status of such an object may be. Does it have an existence out-
side the mind? In this context, let us come back to our distinction 
made at the outset between two senses of “object of thought” 
(noouvmenon). If we say that Parmenides concludes from the thought 
to something existing outside the mind, we mean that he concludes 
from a thought or a content of thought (g1) to something that con-
stitutes this content (g2). In general, objects of thought as mental 
contents (g1) are characterized by an “intentional inexistence”79. 
Therefore, we are not permitted to conclude that such a content ex-
ists outside the human mind. To conclude from a thought to an 
object outside the human mind seems, however, to lie at the basis of 
Parmenides’ reply to Socrates’ proposal that Forms may be 
thoughts. Even before Plato, the invalidity of such an inference had 
been pointed out by Gorgias of Leontini80. He reminds us that the 
 
78 This is in accordance with M.F. BURNYEAT, Idealism and Greek Philosophy cit., 
p. 21, statement: «What is remarkable about this argument is its swiftness and the 
brutality of its realism. Plato is certainly capable of more sophisticated treatment of the 
relation of thought to its objects. [...] But the very fact that he allows his Eleatic 
spokesman to get away with it reveals, I think, that it simply did not occur to him 
that there might be a serious philosophical thesis to be developed out of Socrates’ sug-
gestion that Forms are thoughts» (Italics are mine). 
79 Cfr. R.M. CHISHOLM, s.v. Intentionality, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, IV 
(Hinduism to Logic), London-New York 1967. 
80 GORG. 82 B 3, 79 D.-K. (= fr. 3, 79 Buchheim). This text was the subject of 
an interesting article by V. CASTON, Gorgias on Thought and its Objects, in V. CASTON-
D.W. GRAHAM (eds), Presocratic Philosophy, Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourela-
tos, Aldershot 2002, pp. 205-32, a discussion of which would, however, go beyond 
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fact that we think of a chariot driving on the sea by no means im-
plies that such a chariot really exists. Therefore, Parmenides’ infer-
ence does not seem to be valid. 
But is Parmenides/Plato committed to such an error? First of 
all, the example of fictitious entities seems not appropriate to refute 
Parmenides’ reasoning, because according to Plato there are no 
Forms of them. Let us remember that the extension of the world of 
Forms was already discussed in 130 B-D81. From the list given 
there, we can conclude with certainty that fictitious entities are ex-
cluded. The whole discussion between Socrates and Parmenides 
about the nature of Forms and participation presupposes the dis-
cussion on the extension of Forms. 
Secondly, and most importantly, if we consider the argument 
as being about concept acquisition, as suggested above, we rather 
have to ask why can we think of something after all. For Plato, thought 
is constituted by means of, on the one hand, innate knowledge, and 
on the other, sense perception. The interplay of both makes recollec-
tion and universal thought possible82. Against this background, say-
ing that a thought necessarily has an object boils down to the prob-
lem of how a (universal) thought comes about/originates. Thought, 
somehow, has to start from sense perception. That is, the content of 
thought originates first of all because of sense perception. If Forms 
were mere thoughts, we could not relate our mental contents to the 
world we live in. One of the main problems of a conceptualist ap-
proach to reality lies in the fact that it is not easy to see how or from 
where the content of universal thoughts could possibly originate. 
 
the scope of this paper. 
81 On the question of what things are there Forms see the excellent overview in 
H. DÖRRIE-M. BALTES, Der Platonismus in der Antike, Band 5: Die philosophische Lehre 
des Platonismus. Platonische Physik (im antiken Verständnis), II: Bausteine 125-150, Text, 
Übersetzung, Kommentar, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1998, pp. 336-50. 
82 I do not want to address the problem here whether recollection is only con-
cerned with higher learning, see D. SCOTT, Recollection and Experience. Plato’s Theory of 
Learning and its Successors, Cambridge 1995. Contrary to Scott, I suppose that we can 
only have universal thoughts/concepts because of our innate knowledge. 
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For Plato, who undoubtedly was a realist, it is obvious that 
common properties or common attributes are outside the mind. 
We have warrant for this both in symp. 210 B-C, but also in Phaedr. 
249 B-C. Both passages illustrate how universal thought originates. 
It has to take its start from common properties which are caused by 
a single Form. Because of this, it is reasonable to argue that if we 
think of some universal, we initially think of it as a common prop-
erty that several individuals share. I take it that Plato holds that we 
can perform such a mental operation, that is, to go over from many 
individuals that share a common attribute to a single universal 
thought, because we possess innate knowledge83. 
Coming back to argument (A), we can state that saying a 
thought needs an object Parmenides suggests that in order to origi-
nate, a thought needs an object, a fundamentum in re (some common 
attribute or property). A thought as thought process is empty. 
Therefore, Forms cannot be human thoughts (empty thought proc-
esses). The contents of human thought results from a combination 
of sense perception and recollection. Universal thought takes its 
start from common properties of individuals84. 
Moreover, argument (B) is rather interesting. Nowadays, we 
might consider it less convincing because of its strong ontological 
implications. However, in Antiquity it found an interesting echo. 
Aristotle advances similar arguments against the existence of Forms 
and against participation85. In short, the problem is that Forms qua 
 
83 On PLAT. Phaedr. 249 B-C see CH. HELMIG, What is the Systematic Place cit. 
84 Cfr. ARISTOT. an. post. B 19. 100 a 7-8: toù eJno;" para; ta; pollav, o} a]n ejn 
a{pasin e}n ejnh/` ejkeivnoi" to; aujtov. This characterisation of a universal concept in the 
human mind recalls the already familiar phrase from PLAT. Parm. 132 C 6-7: Ei\ta oujk 
ei\do" e[stai toùto to; noouvmenon e}n ei\nai, ajei; o]n to; aujto; ejpi; pàsin… 
85 See ARISTOT. metaph. A 9. 990 b 27-34; metaph. I 9. 1059 a 10-4; cfr. also top. 
E 7. 137 b 3-13. The problem is touched upon in G.E.L. OWEN, Dialectic and Eristic 
in the Treatment of the Forms, in ID. (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic: the ‘Topics’, Papers of the 
Third Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford 1968, pp. 103-25 (esp. 122-5), but com-
prehensively addressed by G. VLASTOS, The “Two-Level Paradoxes” in Aristotle, in Pla-
tonic Studies, Princeton 1973, pp. 323-34 (originally published in 1971), who calls it 
the “two-level paradox”. I am indebted to Jan Opsomer (Köln) for the references. An-
other reminiscence of the Parmenides passage is de an. G 4. 429 b 26-8 (noted by R.D. 
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Forms have certain properties that the participants certainly do not 
share. For instance, Forms are by definition eternal or immobile. 
Then, however, the question arises why these properties are not 
shared by the participants. With the Neoplatonists, it was consid-
ered especially troublesome, since for them the Forms were held to 
be divine thoughts and as such causes of all things. The solution 
Proclus advances in his commentary interprets the Forms both as 
causes and caused, that is, as causes they only bestow a certain par-
ticular feature (ijdivwma) on their participants, while their being 
thoughts does not necessarily belong to their nature, but is only an 
acquired or caused property86. 
We are now in a position to say that Parmenides’ refutation of 
Socrates’ suggestion yields two results. First, Forms are not 
thought processes, they are rather objects of thought (in the sense 
of g2). Second, if Forms are thought processes, all the participants 
would either think or, although being a thought, not think87. Ar-
gument one (A) has an epistemological character, while the second 





I have criticised Allen’s argument and re-established the read-
ing that the refutation of conceptualism in Plato’s Parmenides has a 
strong realist ring, so strong that Burnyeat even spoke of the «bru-
tality of its realism». It uses a distinction between thoughts and 
objects of thought. These objects of thought refer to something 
outside the human mind, namely to a common element on/over 
(ejpiv) the many participants. Allen’s attempt to question this was 
not successful and his reconstruction should be rejected because it 
contains several flaws and inaccuracies. It became clear that his read-
 
Hicks in his commentary ad loc.). 
86 PROCL. in Parm. IV 901.18-906.2 Cousin. 
87 For the reconstruction of the second argument cfr. above pp. 324-5. 
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ing of the passage as one continuous argument is untenable. In par-
ticular, the fact that in order to make his case Allen introduced ad-
ditional premisses, which cannot be found in the passage in ques-
tion, proved to be incorrect. Both arguments advanced by 
Parmenides against Socrates’ suggestion that Forms are thoughts 
(A, B) can be considered valid in a Platonic context. It was pointed 
out that the first argument (A) is not based on the questionable 
conclusion from a thought or content of thought to an object out-
side the mind. Rather, it tries to solve the question how a thought 
originates and argues that thoughts (as thoughts of Forms) need to 
have a fundamentum in re. That is, every act of recollection takes its 
start from sense perception and from the common properties of in-
dividuals. 
